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CONSTRUCTION OF WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS
By RICHARD R. POWELL*

In addressing you on the Construction of Written Instruments, I am dealing with one of the oldest processes in
human life. Since the art of writing had its most primitive
beginning, man has devoted much of his life to the ascertainment of the ideas earlier recorded on stone, on wax, on
papyrus or on some printed page. Writings of a religious
character have been, and are being, combed over and over in
the effort to derive therefrom the last item of light as to the
truth sought to be revealed thereby. Writings of a secular
character have been similarly treated in the efforts of scholars
of literature and of philosophy to penetrate the veils established by the writings of men like Plato, Virgil, Shakespeare,
Milton and Kant. Perhaps some now before me sat in
Harvard College at the feet of Professor Kittredge and
marvelled at how much of fragrance, how much of language
history, how much of meaning could be unwrapped from the
twirls of a single written phrase from Hamlet.
As men of law our lives are largely occupied with this
same process. Constantly it is our task to construe the contracts, deeds or wills drawn by others, or to determine the
* Professor of Law at Columbia University School of Law. This article is
part of a series of lectures delivered before the Law Institute of the Indianapolis
Bar Association in December 1938. A further installment will appear in the
April issue of the Journal.
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scope and applicability of some statute. When not thus
construing the work of others we spend much time in drafting
instruments of a like character for the puzzlement of our
brethren and our successors. The art of drafting cannot exist
save in one skillful in the process of construction. The
importance of this process of construction has grown tremendously in the past two decades due to the rapid increase
both in the number of our statutes and in the frequencq with
which existing statutes affect the problems of current life.
In 1930, Max Radin of the School of Jurisprudence at the
University of California said this:
"Anglo-American law is in a fair way of becoming statutory, not
by a great act of summation like the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch or the
Swiss Code, but piecemeal by the relentless annual or biennial grinding
of more than fifty legislative machines." [43 Harv. L. Rev. 863
(1930).]
The accelerating character of the increase in problems of
statutory construction is inescapably demonstrated by an
examination of the four Decennial Digests published by the
West Publishing Company. Each of these digests covers a
ten year period, as you know. The first covers the period of
1897-1906, the fourth the ten years ending in 1936. Each
digest has a segment dealing with the topic of statutory construction. For the earliest of these four decades we find
forty-four pages of the short case summaries on statutory
construction; for the second decade, ninety-seven pages; for
the third decade, one hundred thirty-four pages; for the last
decade, two hundred forty-six pages! This experience of the
country as a whole is duplicated in this State of Indiana. In
the last published volume of the reports of your highest court
(Vol. 211) there are at least eighteen cases in which the
opinions center on a problem of statutory construction. If
each of you now before me would add together those hours
in the past seven days which have been spent either in seeking
to know the meaning of contracts, wills, deeds or statutes
drawn by others, or in the preparation of like instruments
which will require construction in the future, I venture the
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guess that, in a majority of your experiences, the total would
constitute a major fraction of your working hours. Large as
this fraction is, the probabilities are that it will daily become
greater. More than ever before,-and wisely too-people
regulate their affairs of moment by a written document.
Those who have accumulated wealth to leave on death have
come to realize the wisdom of a will. No Federal agency
for the rewarding of "plowed-in" crops of legislation has yet
been established. So, while you cannot be asked as yet for
the unreasonable act of faith that would be involved in
believing that what I have to say is important, I am compelled to recognize the vital importance of the topic upon
which you have asked me to speak.
Two matters of a preliminary character require brief presentation. In the first place, it is necessary that we speak
a common language. I do not mean to suggest that the
differing dialects of Manhattan and Indianapolis create difficulties in our mutual understanding. I am rather stressing
the importance of your knowing exactly the sense 'in which
the word "construction" is to be used by me throughout these
lectures. In the second place it is necessary that we examine
the differing types of written instruments which the lawyer
and the judge are required to construe, and to set forth those
factors as to each type which give peculiarities or uniqueness
to the process of the construction of instruments of that
type.
First then let us consider the inclusiveness of the word
"construction."
Every written instrument is the attempted
recordation of a series of ideas theretofore had by some
definite individual. Each of these ideas is recorded at varying
length, sometimes occupying a paragraph, sometimes a sentence, and occasionally a phrase or word only. Obviously
the first task, then, is to squeeze out from each of these
segregated paragraphs, sentences, phrases or words, just as
near an approximation to the idea sought to be embodied
therein, as is obtainable. This initial process of deriving
ideas from the symbols used to denote ideas is often spoken
of as "interpretation." But after this process has been com-
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pleted, it then becomes necessary to assemble the ideas thus
separately derived into a working and consistent whole. Perhaps some of you are familiar with the task of putting
together a garage or a house for which some concern has
furnished the necessary part, supposedly all cut to measure.
This second step in the handling of a written instrument has
many similarities to that task of the assembly of a prefabricated garage. Here and there new cutting and fitting
is required. Now and then a piece is found which is excess
baggage. Now and then a piece is not found which is most
necessary. This fitting together of the separate pieces was
thus illuminatingly described by Mr. Justice Holmes writing
nearly forty years ago:
"A word generally has several meanings even in the dictionary.
You have to consider the sentence in which it stands to decide which
of those meanings it bears in the particular case, and very likely will
see that it there has a shade of significance more refined than any
given in the word book . . . So when you let whatever galvanic
current may come from the rest of the instrument run through the
particular sentence, you still are doing the same thing." [12 Harv.
L. Rev. 417 (1899).]
Sometimes this second step alone is spoken of as "construction." In such usage the words "interpretation" and "construction" are used to denote the two successive steps in a
larger process; construction begins, whenever necessary, only
after interpretation has been completed. It is my conviction
that this differentation is no material help to careful thinking
and is too refined for practical helpfulness. In discarding
this differentiation I am following the example of John Chipman Gray, of Albert Kales, of George Bogert and of Lewis
Simes. During the two and one-half years in which I have
been drafting the chapters on the construction of written
instruments for the Restatement of the Law of Property, I
have found no necessity for, or helpfulness in, the making of
a distinction between "interpretation" and "construction."
Either word can properly be used to denote the two-step
process of first deriving the separate ideas sought to be com-
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municated by the draftsman of the instrument, and, second,
of grinding and burnishing these component parts so that
they become units in a coherent entity. In these lectures I
shall use the term "construction" in this comprehensive sense.
Before we leave this concept of "construction" the relationship between the process of "construction" and the determination of the effectiveness of the instrument construed
requires our attention. When, as lawyers we speak of
bringing a "proceeding to obtain the construction of a will"
we are thinking of a proceeding in which the Court will
declare not only what plan of disposition was desired by the
testator but also what part of that plan is lawful under the
applicable rule against perpetuities or other similar rule
established for the protection of society. It is, of course,
wholly true that after the composite idea of the draftsman
of an instrument has been as fully apprehended as human
ingenuity, operating. within the established restrictions set
by the rules of evidence, permits, it is still necessary to
determine the effectiveness of the command embodied in the
construed statute or of the dispositive provision found in the
construed conveyance. As to statutes there are constitutional
restrictions which must not be disregarded. As to wills and
declarations of trust there are the rules against perpetuities
and accumulations and other similar rules fixing the outer
limits within which only the instrument can have effect. It
is folly to suggest, and more folly to believe that courts shut
their eyes to the consequences of validity or invalidity between
which they are in fact choosing when they engage in the
process of construction. Thus the rules as to effectiveness
provide a frame for the process of construction, and like the
frames of other pictures, exert a distinctly observable influence upon that which is framed. To the extent that this
frame alters the shades or tints as we look at the central
problems of construction, I shall include in these lectures on
construction a consideration of the rules determining the effectiveness of instruments.
Thus the term "construction," for the purposes of these
lectures not only includes the two steps of, first, examining

INDIANA LAW

JOURNAL

the written language symbols for the ascertainment of their
symbolism, and, second, putting together the separate symbolisms into a coherent entity, but also requires due consideration
of the occasionally threatening sword of Damocles to be
found in the rules fixing limits for the effectiveness of written instruments.
Now that we have an agreed meaning for the word "construction," I desire next to discuss with you those factors
which cause the problem of construction to be different
according to the type of written instrument presented for
construction. During the course of our three days together
we shall consider, with varying degrees of detail, nine different types of written instruments. These are wills, inter vivos
declarations of trust, inter vivos conveyances not involving
a trust, contracts, state statutes, Federal statutes, state constitutions, the Federal Constitution and treaties of the United
States. There is a real danger in considering such divergent
types of instruments in any single discussion. A disregarding
of their essential differences could be a most fertile source of
unsound conclusions. Since it is my hope that the legal techniques of all of us will be enriched by the cross-fertilization of
these often separately pigeonholed bodies of law, it is
obviously my duty to set out the danger signs which will keep
us all within the limits of safety, in the drawing of generalizations.
A major line of demarcation must be noted between written instruments which are "public" rather than "private" in
function. Constitutions, statutes and treaties are of the
former type while wills, deeds and contracts are of the latter
type. When a will or a deed or a contract is construed, rights
are recognized and denied within the circle of a relatively
small group. It is true that a judicially made construction
constitutes a precedent, but the infinite number of possible
variations in wording and circumstances, which gives more
than a scintilla of truth to the phrase that "No will has a
brother," can prevent this precedent from having substantial
after effects, if the conviction is formed that such an effect is
one which should be avoided. When, on the other hand, a
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statute, constitution or treaty is construed, the future effects
of this construction are likely to be more important than the
immediate outcome of the litigation in which the problem
arises. Thus in construing a written instrument having a
public function, the process of construction must occur in a
fashion consonant with the intended permanence and the
contemplated generality of application of the rule which is
reached.
Within the class of written instruments which have been
grouped as "public" in function certain similarities and differences deserve attention. All of them are alike in that commonly they are formulated and worded by a group other than
the group whose act makes them binding. This is most
readily seen in the case of a constitution or a treaty. In the
Summer of 1938 a constitutional convention labored in the
State of New York drafting extensive proposed changes in
the fundamental law of that State. A little more than a
week ago the electorate chose six out of nine parts of the
proposal which henceforth are to be in effect. This is the
usual process throughout our States and it was the procedure
followed in the drafting of the original Federal Constitution.
Treaties are negotiated by gentlemen of the State Department but become effective by act of the Senate. Federal
statutes, particularly those of large importance, are commonly drafted under the auspices of a committee chosen to
study and to report upon the subject matter involved. Actually the drafting is frequently done by one or two or a
small group of such committee. It has been truly said:
"Theoretically the legislative power is exerted by the informed agreement of the majority. In actual practice, however, the legislative power
is exercised only by a small group of influential members, ordinarily the
sponsors of the act, the committee members and the party leaders."

The chief difference between Federal and State legislation
in this regard, is that, as to State action, it is more difficult to
trace the sources of proposed legislation to the person or
group responsible for its text. The same system of doing
most of the legislative work in committees is followed, but
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wholly .inadequate records are kept of these highly important
steps in the embryology of our law. Thus treaties, constitutions and statutes are not couched in words which were
chosen by those whose assent give them validity, but are in
language selected by other persons whose guiding purposes
are often wholly unknown and unapproved by those whose
assent make them binding. A striking illustration of this
occurred in the State of New York. As a consultant for the
Law Revision Commission of the State of New York I
drafted the statute which now appears as § 66-a of the Real
Property Law of that State. It provides as follows:
"When a limitation, if contained in a will, would create a tenancy
in common of legal or equitable interests with implied cross remainders
between the tenants in common, then the same limitation, if contained
in a deed, shall have the same effect."
At a session of the Law Revision Commission I explained
the purpose and scope of this very unimportant statute. The
Law Revision Commission approved my purpose and the text
and wrote a brief note explaining the objective of the
statute and sent this proposed statute and note to the legislature. A member of that body became the sponsor of the
bill. While the bill was pending an inquiring member of the
committee to which the bill had been referred met another
legislator who was a lawyer and said: "Tom, what's this bill
mean about cross-remainders?"
The answer came back:
"Jack, I wouldn't know a cross-remainder if I met one on the
street I" The bill was passed despite this legislative unawareness of its import. Every volume of the Session Laws of this
or any other State bears eloquent and frequent witness to like
acts of faith. Even when the text of a bill has been read
and reasonably grasped by the legislators who vote for it,
the fact remains that few, if any, of them participated in the
actual selection of the words in which it is couched. I do not
need to remind this gathering of the extent to which the final
revised draft of a contract retains the imprint of the ideas of
the man who drew the first draft of such contract. Thus it
may be fairly said that treaties, constitutions and statutes
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commonly represent the ideas of persons more remote than
those who vote their adoption. This has high significance on
problems of construction and will receive further discussion
tomorrow in connection with our effort to determine what is
meanf by, and how we ascertain, the "intent of the legislature."
Despite the similariiy between written instruments which
are "public" in function, statutes and constitutions have one
essential difference important to our present topic. A statute
is designed to accomplish immediate ends within a relatively
restricted field of operation. The enacting body meets with
recurrent regularity and can readily speak anew if the prior
utterance, as construed, fails to attain the desired end. Constitutions, on the other. hand, etsablish the general outlines of
a frame of government and are not subject to easy modification when a construction has been made which is ill-suited to
the common welfare. Thus it is at least arguable that in
construing a constitution, one is not restricted to what the
framers thereof thought they were saying, nor even to what
they would then have said, if the present problem had been
suggested to them for decision, but rather that one should
ask what would men of the present, having a caliber and
interest in public weal comparable to these framers, now say
upon the problem now faced. Whether one does or does
not go that far in liberality of construing a constitution it is
certain that a constitution deserves greater liberality in its
construction than does a statute.
Of the nine varieties of written instruments to be considered in these lectures, four fall into the major division of
those which are "private" in function. These are wills, inter
vivos declarations of trust, inter vivos conveyances not involving a trust and contracts. The first two of these four are to
be sharply set off from the latter two. Typically a will or an
inter vivos declaration of trust is the voluntary, uncompensated distribution of his wealth by a conveyor. The instrument purports to set forth the ideas and desires of one person.
In construing such an instrument a lawyer comes the nearest
to having a problem comparable to the task of the theologian
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in interpreting the Scriptures or of the literary scholar in
understanding the writings of Milton or of Shakespeare.
Some one has spoken and we must now envisage what was in
the mind of that one when he spoke. As Dean Gavit of the
School of Law of the University of Indiana has so persuasively written:
"No one can show that he has properly relied upon the objectivity

of what the testator said, or that he is materially harmed if a subjective standard is used. He is a volunteer; the donee of a gift."
[Gavit-Indiana Law § 38].
In fact Dean Gavit's book on the Indiana Law of Future
Interests, Descent and Wills, published four years ago does
so excellent a job in differentiating between the construction
of wills and deeds that I feel safe in assuming that none of
you is unfamiliar therewith. The part to which I am now
referring is in his Sections 33 to 41 inclusive. When the
conveyance is a will or a voluntary declaration of trust,- the
element of bargain is lacking and the ultimate goal of the
process of construction, as applied to such an instrument is
to ascertain the actual desires of the testator or settlor and
to effectuate these desires in so far as they do not conflict with
rules established for the safeguarding of the welfare of
society.
One factor, however, slightly complicates the seeming simplicity of this picture. Wills or declarations of trust are not
always penned by the testator or settlor. Especially when
substantial property is involved, their wording is normally
selected by a lawyer and typed by his stenographer. The
interposition of this filter may have either one of two consequences. The lawyer-filter may have the consequences of a
light-filter in photography by which the picture is enhanced
in both clarity and beauty. But alas, the lawyer-filter may
also be like the filter of the bacteriologist, eliminating the
vital ingredient from the substance whch comes through.
The presence of this word-man between the brain of the. conconveyor and the symbols presented for construction makes
it necessary sometimes to query the accuracy of the instru-
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ment as a recordation of the mind of the conveyor. The interposition of a ghost-writer, whether it be for a speech in
the Congress of the United States or in the preparation of a
will, has its risks.
In the remaining two types of written instruments namely
contracts and inter vivos conveyances not involving a trust,
a new element is in the picture. Two or more persons have
dealt with each other and have concluded a bargain. Their
communications to each other and the written embodiment of
their transaction must be viewed not from the viewpoint of
the utterer alone but from the viewpoint of the listener as
well. A word, a phrase, a sentence must be examined to
determine not only the idea which set it in motion but also
the picture which it caused to arise when heard or read. This.
element of objectivity requires a stress not justified in connection with a donative instrument such as a will.
Thus in our subsequent discussions of construction when we
bring together on one point cases involving variant types of
written instruments, we must ever be alert to note whether
some one of these essential differences between the types of
instruments involved vitiates the soundness of the conclusion
reached. The construction of an instrument is, and should
be, determined in part by the public or private character of
the instrument, by the degree of permanence and the breath
of applicability contemplated for it and by the donative or
paid-for character of the disposition made thereby.
In order to bring these lectures within the reasonable confines of your patience, I shall concentrate the discussion
chiefly upon written instruments of two types. The first type
consists of dispositions of property made without consideration and taking the form of a will or of an inter vivos
declaration of trust. The second type consists of statutes.
Excursions into the problems of construction raised by other
varieties of written instruments will be restricted to instances
where I believe some illumination can be thus derived for the
narrower field to which your attention is primarily directed.
In thus introducing my subject, defining the term construction as herein employed, pointing out to you factors which
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need to be borne in mind throughout the balance of our time
together because they individualize the problems arising as to
distinct types of instruments, I have consumed some thirty
minutes. In the remaining time at our joint disposal I shall
center my discussion about four foci.
First: the requirement that the written instrument or instruments in question be read as an entirety, rather than
seriatim by clauses.
Second: the utilization of facts extrinsic to the text of a
will or of a voluntary inter vivos declaration of trust, in determining its meaning.
Third: the utilization of facts extrinsic to the text of a
statute in determining its meaning.
Fourth: the diagnosis and resolution of problems of construction frequently litigated as to future interests in wills
and voluntary inter vivos declarations of trust.
FIRST:

The requirement that the written instrument or instruments
be read as an entirety, rather than seriatim by clauses.
In the year 1933 the Legislature of Indiana renovated the
taxation statutes of this state. Legislation on the subject of
taxation is seldom accepted gracefully by the persons into
whose pockets it delves and these statutes proved to be a
rather fertile source of litigation. I desire to refer to four
of the resultant opinions in presenting to you the existent
rules as to the treating of any given piece of legislation as an
entirety.
By the Gross Income Tax Statute (Laws 1933, c. 50, § 3)
an income tax was levied at the rate of one-fourth of one per
cent upon certain types of income and at the rate of one per
cent upon other types of income. Naturally there was a great
preference among taxpayers for inclusion in the categories
paying one-fourth of one per cent. Three of the clauses of
Section 3 gave rise to most of the resultant controversies.
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Clause (a) provided for the lower rate of tax
"Upon the entire gross income of every person engaged in the business of manufacturing, compounding or preparing for sale, profit or
use, any article or articles, substance or substances, commodity or commodities;
"

Clause (c) provided for the higher rate of tax
"Upon the entire gross income of every person engaged in the business of retailing of any tangible commodity or commodities [with an
exception not now material]"
Clause (f) provided for the higher rate of tax in all cases
not specifically covered by other Clauses.
The Indiana Creosoting Co. had its office and plant at
Bloomington, Indiana and there creosoted ties and timber
for the Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Railway Company.
For the first two quarters of 1934 it paid the tax at the rate
of one-quarter of one per cent, claiming to be engaged in the
business defined in Clause (a) as "manufacturing, compounding or preparing." The State Department of the Treasury
assessed a deficiency tax claiming the applicability of Clause
(f). The case under the name, Indiana Creosoting Co. v.
McNutt, came to the Supreme Court of the State and is
reported in 210 Ind. 656 (Dec. 23, 1936). After dismissing
other claims of the taxpayer, in which we now have no interest, the Court came to the question of the statutory construction of the clauses in Section 3. Judge Hughes writing for
the Court said (at p. 667) :
"If we were to consider the word 'prepare' alone and unconnected
with the words 'manufacturing' and 'compounding' there might be
some reason for the appellant's construction of this part of Section 3-a.

We think, however, that all of the language must be construed together to determine the meaning of Section 3-a. The meaning of a
word used in a statute must be construed with reference to all other

words used therein and with which it is associated. It is a rule of
statutory construction that effect must be given to the whole statute
and every part thereof. We think the words 'manufactured,' 'compounded,' and 'prepared,' as used in the statute must be construed in
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connection with each other. They are all qualified by the words 'for
sale, profit or use' and form a classification as being taxable at onefourth of one per cent. We do not think that the appellant's business
comes within the meaning of the words 'engaged in the business of
manufacturing, compounding or preparing for sale, profit or use any
article . . .' so that the gross income would be taxed at one-fourth
of one per cent. The work done in creosoting the ties is nothing more
than a service rendered for the purpose of preserving them and can not
be placed in the classification of manufacturing, compounding, or preparing for sale, profit, or use of any article, any more than could the
painting of a house, buggy, or wagon. The service of all is for the
same purpose-preservation of the material, the only difference being
the method of the work and the material used."

Hence the court sustained the imposition of the one per
cent tax on the ground that the company came within the
catch-all Clause (f).
At about the same time the Supreme Court decided Dept.
of the Treasury v. Ridgely, 211 Ind. 9 at 16-19 (Rehearing
denied Jan. 12, 1937). A druggist in Gary did a rather large
business in the filling and re-filling of physician's prescriptions.
He claimed to be taxable on his gross income under Section
3-a urging that this work was "compounding or preparingfor
sale." It clearly was. But the State very properly chose to
read Clause (c) and urged that the druggist's work was the
"business of retailing" a tangible commodity. It clearly was.
A situation had now arisen in which the income of this
druggist was within the provisions of two clauses when those
clauses were read literally.

Yet obviously only one could be

held applicable. Which should it be and upon what basis is
the choice to be made? Let us see how Judge Roll, writing
for the Court handled this problem:
"But granting that in this case the prescription business, in each
instance, involved the act of compounding, is that fact decisive of the
question here presented, in favor of appellees? We do not think so.
Appellees in their brief set out the definition of the word 'compound'
as defined by Webster's New International Dictionary as follows. (And
we accept this definition for the purpose of this discussion.)
'(I) To put together, as elements, ingredients or parts, to form
a whole, to combine, to unite.
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(2) 1 o form or make up as a composite product, by combining
different elements, ingredients, or parts; as, to combine a medicine.'
If we should accept appellees' application, that all income derived from
the sale of merchandise, that involve the element of 'compounding'
then it would follow that the greater part of the soda fountain business would come under this classification, for the serving of ice cream
sodas, sundaes of different varieties and many other combinations involve the putting together of different ingredients or parts to form a
whole. Likewise bakeries who make bread, pies, cakes, and etc., to
sell at retail would come within this group. Also groceries, who mix
and prepare the coffee, tea, spices, vinegar, extracts and a countless number of articles for sale at retail would come within this classification.
All of these involve the act of putting together, mixing different ingredients to form a whole, but yet this fact does not take away from such
business the principal characteristic or attribute of retail sale. The fact
remains that the article compounded is sold to the individual for final
consumption at a price to cover the cost of the different elements, plus
the expense of preparing the article for sale.
"We think section three and the subsections thereof, classifying income derived from different business, should receive a practical and
workable construction.

.

.

.

The business of compounding is used

immediately after the word manufacturing, and in the same section
with that of mining, the production of oil, natural gas, and the felling
of timber, which gives us some light as to the meaning and construction
the legislature intended to give it. Does it seem reasonable to say that
the legislature intended to tax the gross income derived from the sale
of any article that involved the act of compounding, at the rate of onefourth of one per cent, without considering the character of his business or any other fact or circumstance connected therewith. That would
be unreasonable. The partnership mentioned herein was engaged in the
retail business."
So this court resolved the undoubted conflict between the
literal meanings of the two Clauses by reading each in the

light of the other and finding in the provision of Clause (c)
for retailing a necessary qualification upon and exception to
the "compounding" provision of Clause (a). Reading the
Section as a whole the apparent inclusiveness of one clause
is cut down to permit reasonable efficacy to a later clause
thereof. This is eminently good sense as well as a sound
application of the rules of statutory construction. It is
worthy of note that in 1937 your legislature revised Section 3
so as td eliminate the further necessity for meeting those

INDIANA LAW1V JOURNAL

problems of construction which had theretofore caused trouble [Laws 1937, c. 117].
In the same year of 1933 the statute levying a tax on
intangibles was enacted [Laws 1933, c. 81], and the constitutionality of the statute was challenged upon many grounds
in the leading case of Lutz v. Yrnold, reported in 208 Ind.
480 at 489-491, 500 (1935).
Two of its points are important to our present theme. The statute's constitutionality
was challenged on the ground that it levied a property tax
and not an excise tax. Section 2 [Burns, § 64-902] provided:
"On and after the passage of this act, every person residing in and/or
domiciled in this state, shall pay a tax to the State of Indiana at the
rate and in the manner provided in this act, for the right to exercise
any one or more of the following privileges:"
Judge Hughes, writing for the Court said:
"The declaration in a statute that the tax is of a particular nature,
while not conclusive, is very important and must be given consideration
in construing the statute."
He quoted with approval a still stronger statement from a
decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
declaring that:
"The declared purpose of the act is to be accepted as true unless
incompatible with its meaning and effect."
So we find that a doubt as to the purpose and effect of a
statute left in the mind after reading its commands, should
be resolved so as not to conflict with a prior clause declaring
the legislature's purpose in making the enactment. All parts
of the statute are to be read as an entirety in deriving its
net effects and mode of operation.
But the constitutionality of this statute was further challenged on the ground that the "classification as provided for
in said act is arbitrary and unreasonable" since there is no
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real or natural reason why banks, trust companies, building
and loan companies and certain other corporations should be
excluded from its provisions as they are. The Court promptly
answered this contention with these words:
"This contention cannot be sustained for the reason that chapters 82
and 83 both have to do with taxation and take care of the situation
complained of. Chapters 81, 82 and 83 must be construed together
as parts of one body of law and as together expressing the legislative
will. These three chapters were enacted by the same legislature and
approved on the same day. * * * As said in the case of State ex
rel. Baker v. Grange (1928) 20G Ind. 506, 509, 165 N.E. 239:
'Statutes which relate to the same thing, or to the same subject, person or object are in pari materia and it is presumed that
such acts are imbued with the same spirit and actuated by the
same policy,

.

.

.

and they should be construed together as if

parts of the same act, . . . to determine their affect
.
This applies with peculiar force to statutes passed at the same
session of the legislature
"So construing the three chapters, we find that the objections raised
as to the classification cannot be sustained."
Herein we see an extension of the doctrine o.
freading a

single statute as an entirety. Not only must that be done,
but we must go further and read this statute as one unit in
the series of separate statutes constituting the execution of
one general program.
The same statute was again before your highest Court in
Zoercher v. Indiana Assoc. Telephone Corp., 211 Ind. 447

(1937). In Section 2 of which I quoted the introductory
clauses a few moments ago, one of the "privileges" to which
the tax in terms applied was the "signing, executing and issuing of intangibles." In 1936 the Telephone Corporation
issued $3,000,000 of bonds. The State Board of Tax Commissioners held that the corporation had exercised its taxed

privilege and imposed a tax. The corporation paid and sued
for the return of the sum paid.

Section 2 explicitly included

the act of issuing bonds as one of the privileges taxed by the
statute when exercised. The Court admitted this, saying:
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"If this subsection stood alone, the appellants would have strong
reason for the contention, but it does not stand alone and it must be
construed with all the other provisions of said Sec. 2 and with all other
sections of the act. The whole act must be construed together in order
to determine the meaning of the act and the intent of the legislature."

The Court asserted that a statute may properly be construed in a manner which the "exact and literal meaning [of

its words] would not warrant."
book to this effect:

It quoted a standard text-

"'Not only may the meaning of words be restricted by the subject
matter of an act or to avoid repugnance with other parts, but for like
reasons they may be expanded. The application of the words of a single
provision may be enlarged or restrained to bring the operation of the
act within the intention of the legislature, when violence will not be
done by such interpretation to the language of the statute.'"

It concluded:
"The intent of the legislature should be given effect, though the strict
letter of the statute may not be followed."

Upon this basis of doctrine the Court proceeded with its
examination of the statute as a whole and found that in the
five clauses subsequent to the one here in litigation the tax
clearly was payable by the holder of the intangible and that
this intent so permeated the entire statute that the clause on
the "signing, executing and issuing of intangibles" must be
restricted within similar limits. So that clause was held not

to tax the original issuer of bonds, although this injected an
exception or modification of the express language found in
the statute.
In the four cases on statutory construction thus far considered we find a unanimity in judicial attitudes. There is to
be no close inspection of a statute, clause by clause, in the
effort to find inconsistency between successive provisions.
Rather there is to be broad examination of the whole statute,
extending even to other statutes enacted as a part of the
same general program, in an effort to see the statutory plan
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as a whole, and seeming conflicts between the literal terms
of the separate parts are to be so resolved as to attain a
workable and coherent whole. I submit that is good sense
and represents as sound and as forward looking an attitude
as can be found in the decisions of any jurisdiction.
Let us now turn our attention to the comparable problem
in written instruments of a private character. Sindlinger v.
Department of FinancialInstitutions reported in 210 Ind. 83
(1936) is worthy of our careful examination. The Union
Trust Company of South Bend became insolvent and was
taken over for liquidation in July, 1933 by the appropriate
State agency. In 1929, as a means of competing with local
building and loan associations, the bank had resolved to
establish a "Savings Investment Department" and to pay
5 2 % interest upon deposits there received. The deposit
book set forth "rules and regulations as to these deposits."
In this printed matter appeared this provision:
"It [the bank] will keep these loans and securities together with the
uninvested cash belonging to this department separate from all of the
other assets belonging to the Company, and will treat them as a special
fund which, though owned by the Company, is set aside to determine
the order of payment of these savings investments."
Upon liquidation the depositors in this Department claimed
priority on the ground that these funds were received by the
bank as trustee rather than as an ordinary bank deposit.
The Court properly treated the rules as set forth in the
pass book as the contract between the bank and their depositors in this Department and declared:
"For the purpose of construing and determining the meaning and
purpose of the contract it must be considered in its entirety."
Looking first to the other parts of the rules the Court found
no difficulty in finding the manifest intention to create a
trust relationship. It then took up the provision in rule 3 that
the assets after deposit are to be "owned by the company."
This had been argued to be inconsistent with the existence of
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the trust relationship.
is worth quoting:

The Court's handling of this matter

"When construed with all of the other provisions of the contract
we think this language is susceptible of such a construction as to be
in harmony therewith. In the very nature of the undertaking and plan
devised it was necessary for the trust company to take all of the mortgages, loans and securities in its name. * * *
"A literal or technical construction of an isolated or special clause
should not be indulged to defeat the true meaning of a contract. The
true meaning of a contract is to be ascertained from a consideration
of all its provisions in order to carry out the true intention of the parties
gathered from the whole instrument. . . . To give such a construction to rule three, as the appellee would have us do, would do violence
to the true meaning of the same and this we can not do. . . . From
all the facts in the instant case it clearly appears that a trust relationship
was intended to be created and this intention can not be stricken down
by any legal refinement of language."
The similarity between this opinion and those previously
considered as to statutes is too clear to require emphasis.
But the end is not yet. Let us look at some of the Indiana
decisions on conveyances of land where the claim of repugnancy has been advanced. First I ask your attention to Snodgrass v. Brandenburg, reported in 164 Ind. 59 (1905). The
will of William Snodgrass was quite brief. Its relevant
clauses were as follows:
"'(2) I bequeath my entire estate, both real and personal, to my
beloved wife, Sarah Snodgrass. (3) I request that as soon as convenient after my death, that my wife shall sell the personal property
sufficient to pay my entire indebtedness. (4) I request that at the death
of my wife, that my estate that I am now seized of, be equally divided
between my children, to wit, John C., Mary A., Cora M., and Dora
Snodgrass.' "

The Court thus expressed its ratio decidendi:
"When the conclusion is finally reached, after an inspection of the

four corners of the will, that it was the intent of the testator to vest a
fee in the first instance, then any subsequent attempt to impose a legal
estate thereon must necessarily fail, as inconsistent with the estate first
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devised. In this case the second clause, standing alone, plainly indicates,
as a matter of interpretation, that it was the testator's purpose to devise
a fee to his wife. A case might be conceived of, however, where, notwithstanding such language, there was a subsequent provision so cogent
as to lead the court to conclude that it was the intention of the testator
to limit the interest of the first taker to a life estate. * *
"In the final disposition of this case we start with the proposition that
clause two was sufficient, when standing alone, clearly to evince the
intent of the testator to devise a fee.

*

*

*

"In the will under consideration the testator requested that at
the death of his wife his estate should be divided. At the utmost, the
fourth clause of the will only served to create a doubt as to whether it
was the testator's intention to limit the second clause, and in such circumstances the subsequent clause is ineffectual."

In an opinion written to sustain the denial of a petition for
a rehearing, the precatory character of the ultimate limitation
in favor of the children was asserted and stressed. Despite
this possible alibi, the fact remains that the successive parts of
this will were not regarded as giving equal light as to the
dispositions made thereby. The Court read the first sentence,
drew a conclusion as to the extent of the interest created by
that sentence alone and then read on to see whether its already
drawn conclusion was overturned by what it later found.
Juries are not supposed to draw any conclusion until they have
before them all the evidence. Courts do not construe statutes
sentence by sentence but as a whole. But here, in the case of
this will, the Court illustrates the unfortunate method of
piece-meal construction, reading and construing its clauses
seriatim rather than as an entirety.
Two later decisions in the lower courts of this state illustrate the lamentable results which follow this policy of construction. In Hume v. McHafle reported in 40 Ind. App.
703 (1907) the will read as follows:
"I give and bequeath unto my wife Nancy L. Cosner all of my real
estate including my residence in Stilesville and all of my household
goods and personal property

*

*

*

after the decease of my wife

Nancy L. Cosner I will that all the real and personal property belonging to her at the time of her decease to be equally divided among my
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three children Emma McHaffie, Nettie Snoddy and Otis Samuel
Cosner.
The Court talked about looking at the will as an entirety
but then said:
"Where real estate is devised in fee simple in one clause of the will
in clear and decisive terms, it cannot be taken away or cut dow by
raising a doubt about a subsequent clause, nor by any inference therefrom, or by any subsequent words that are not as clear and decisive as
the words of the clause giving the estate in fee simple; and where a
devise is plainly given in fee it will not be presumed that the testator
meant by any subsequent words to reduce the estate to one for life, unless
the language employed so indicates such intention, and is as clear and
in as strong terms as that devising the estate in fee simple."
Upon this basis the wife was found to have complete ownership and the children of the testator to have nothing. The
dissenting judge pointed out the unsoundness of the case in
this language:
"It is the rule of construction that all that is said upon a single subject must be considered together. The words of the devise to the wife
do not stand alone. They are a part of the same item, the same clause,
the same sentence, and they are to be considered with the remainder
of the sentence to ascertain the purpose of the testator. * * * The
word "will" means to give, devise and bequeath by a last will or testament, and cannot, in the connection in which it is used, be considered
as a request."
The second of these lower court opinions which I desire to
present to you is Ewart v. Ewart reported in 70 Ind. App.
A paragraph of the will gave described land
167 (1919).
to a son David Ewart:
" 'to have and to hold forever with the power to sell the same and
invest the proceeds in such other property, real or personal, as he may
deem best,' subject to the life estate of testator's wife, Thalia T. Ewart,
'and after the death of my dear son, David, I will and bequeath the
real estate herein in this item to my grandchildren, Verney Ewart,
Alaska Ewart, Lloyd Ewart and Emerson Ewart, equally and should
my son David Ewart sell the real estate in this item bequeathed, he shall
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be deemed a trustee of the fund therefrom derived to this extent, that on
his death whatever of the same is remaining shall descend to my grandchildren as herein provided, to wit: Verney Ewart, Alaska Ewart,
Lloyd Ewart and Emerson Ewart.'"

The son David was held to acquire unqualified ownership
of the described land, and the Court embodied its reasoning
in this sentence:
"It is a well-established rule, that, where an estate is given to a person generally, or indefinitely, with power of disposition, it carries a
fee, and the devise over is repugnant and void."

No later case in your Supreme Court, which I have found,
squarely repudiates this method of construction. It is true
that later cases have sought to avoid applying this rule of
repugnancy, by finding that the first person was not really,
in terms, given a fee simple, as in Keplinger v. Keplinger,
185 Ind. 81 (1916) and in Oliphant v. Pumphrey, 193 Ind.
656 (1923). The line of authority represented by the Snodgrass case, by the Hume case and by the Ewart case is out
of accord with the reasoning used by your Supreme Court in
the statutory construction cases and in the contract case of the
bank which I have cited to you. It represents a piece-meal
process of construction unfortunately given a degree of mistaken respectability by Chancellor Kent over a century ago
(4 Kent's Com. 270). It is explained as Dean Gavit has
said [p. 108] by the doctrine of repugnancy. But no repugnancy exists until the Court decides to pause for rest and to
draw a conclusion while short of the end of the instrument
in question. In other words the repugnancy is the product of
the court's disregard of its own generally accepted rule of
construction, to read the instrument as a coherent whole. So
read, there is no good reason for invalidating the executory
interest limited after a prior fee and such executory interest
should be equally valid without regard to whether the prior
fee owner is given a power of disposition. Such a power
lessens the value of an executory interest subject, to destruction by its exercise but is in no way "repugnant" to the validity
of such interest.
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So in conclusion as to my first topic, I commend to you the
sound policies of your decisions as to the construction of statutes as an entirety, taking into full account all of the provisions of the same or related enactments; I commend also
to you the similar policies pursued by your courts as to contracts; I point out to you the failure to apply this same policy
in the cases of deeds and wills said to involve a repugnancy
and I urge that this is one particular in which the rules now
applied in your State to the construction of deeds and wills
require correction by the utilization of those other but closely
related bodies of authority. In the Restatement of the Law
of Property we have thus expressed the rule generally prevailing in the United States:
"The meaning expressed by the language employed in a conveyance
is to be derived from reading such conveyance as an entirety. Each
sentence or paragraph is a single element in one whole. It is reasonable to infer that their complementary or modifying force upon each
other was intended by the conveyor and this inference must be given
effect by the construer. When the clauses or paragraphs, read seriatim,
involve repugnancies but, read as mutually modifying one another permit a construction as a consistent whole, the latter construction is
adopted. So also the meaning of each clause or part of the instrument
is to be determitied in the light of all aid as to the intended meanings
of words or phrases derivable from their uses elsewhere in the same
instrument, or derivable from other dispositions contained in the instrument." [Tent. Dr. No. 7, § 242, Comment c.]

SECOND:
The utilization of materials extrinsic to a will or to a voluntary inter vivos declaration of trust in the ascertainment
of meaning.
In the latter half of what I have thus far said I have been
stressing the propriety and necessity of utilizing all that can
be found within the four corners of a written instrument in
the process of construing that instrument. But often this is
not enough. In fact I shall seek to convince you that this is
never or at least, seldom ever, enough. While we have been
discussing the interplay and possible mutual modification of the
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words and phrases found within a written instrument we have
been operating upon an assumption, namely that we knew
what each of these words and phrases meant when viewed
separately. How true is that assumption?
Let us approach the problem from yet another angle. The
decisions of this State, as in every other State, are replete
with affirmations of the controlling force of the "intention of
the testator" or of the "intention of the Legislature." Probably no volume of the reports of this State lacks assertions
of both these rules. But these assertions leave us still seeking an answer as to the practically more important questionwhat are the channels of evidence by which one can establish
this all controlling "intent". Are we always or only sometimes restricted to what we can derive from the language
of the instrument? Can we resort only sometimes or always
to the circumstances of the formulation of the instrument?
Our task for the balance of today is to seek the answers to
these questions in so far as they relate to wills or to voluntary
inter vivos declarations of trust. The examination of a series
of Indiana decisions will give us the basis for common
thinking.
Hertford v. Harned, reported in 185 Ind. 213 was decided
in 1916. The testatrix was Matilda Wilson whose home was
in Daviess County. Her will was drawn by a lawyer in
Evansville while she was a patient in a hospital at the latter
town. In the will appeared this clause:
"I hereby give and bequeath to Mrs. Irma Hertford my stock in
the Washington National Bank amounting to One Thousand Dollars

After other specific gifts as to which no questions arose,
there was a residuary clause to Annie Harned, a sister of
testatrix. There was a stipulation of facts, with a proviso
that so far as these were admissible in evidence, the same
should be deemed to be true. From this stipulation it appeared that testatrix inherited 20 shares of stock in the
named bank from her father; that each share had a par value

INDIANA LAW

JOURNAL

of $100; that she sold 10 of these shares; that by virtue of

a stock dividend her remaining ten shares were doubled into
twenty; that when the will was made each of these twenty
shares had a par value of $100 and a sale value of $250; that
her will was drawn at a place distant from her home, and
from the named bank, by a lawyer who had had no contacts
with her, or with the named bank. The controversy was, of

course, as to whether all, or part only, of this bank stock
passed under the clause giving
"my stock in the Washington National Bank amounting to One Thousand Dollars."

The trial court gave 10 shares to the specific legatee under
this clause and the balance to Annie Harned as a residuary

taker. The Supreme Court thus explained its reversal of the
trial court:
"While courts of equity are invested with the power of reforming
written contracts for mutual mistake and of making them conform to
the intent of the contracting parties, they are not clothed with like
authority over wills, nor have they the rightful power to admit extrinsic
evidence to add to, eliminate, or vary the terms of a will as written.
* * * Since, however, it is the object in construing wills to give
effect to the testator's lawful intentions expressed in the will, and since
the law prescribes no technical rule of accuracy either in the description
of the gift or of the donee, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show the
circumstances surrounding the testator when the will was made, and
thus furnish the court engaged in the task of ascertaining the intent
the same light, as near as possible, as that enjoyed by the writer of the
instrument. * * *
"It often happens that the language of a will, on the face thereof,
is sufficiently clear to denote the testator's purpose; yet, when read in
the light of evidence relating to the property owned by him, and the
objects of his bounty, when the will was executed, there develops such
lack of harmony between the language employed and the surrounding
facts as to render the testator's intention obscure. To remove such
latent ambiguity the court may properly inquire into every other material
extrinsic fact to which the will certainly refers, and the relation of the
testator to such facts, to the end that the court may discover the purpose of the testator in the language actually used in the will. * * *
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"We are of the opinion that extraneous facts were admissible in
evidence to remove the latent ambiguity."

The Court cited as supporting authority the case of Patch
v. White, 117 U. S. 210 (1886) where a will devised to a
named person "lot numbered six in square four hundred and
three." On proof that testator did not own the lot so described but did own "lot numbered three in square four
hundred and six," the latter lot passed by the terms of this
will clause. It quoted with approval this part of the Court's
opinion in that case:
" 'The testator, evidently by mistake, put "three" for "six" and "six"
for "three," a sort of mis-speech to which the human mind is perversely
addicted. It is done every day even by painstaking people.' "
The result of this bank stock case is clearly sound. What
guidance in principle does it afford which can be used for the
prediction of future results? It clearly recognizes the propriety of resort to extrinsic factors where latent ambiguity
is found to exist. So much is incontestable. But what established the existence of the latent ambiguity? Was it not
established solely by the resort to extrinsic factors? Before
any further generalization is attempted let us examine further cases.
Clark v. Allen, reported in 189 Ind. 601 was finally decided by the denial of a rehearing in 1920. Levi McKaig
left a very simple will contained in two sentences:
"I give and bequeath to my sister, Martha Watts, the north half
of the southwest quarter of section sixteen, in Noble Township, Cass
county, Indiana, to have and to hold the same for and during her life.
On her death I direct that the said land be sold by my executor and
the proceeds thereof be equally divided between the children then living
of my brothers, John F. McKaig and Watson C. McKaig."

The life tenant is dead and the question is before the
court as to those entitled to the remainder. It was in terms
given "to the children of my brothers John and Watson."
Evidence was introduced that testator had three brothers,
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John, Watson and Robert; that Watson, mentioned in the
will, had never married and was middle aged when the will
was executed; that testator was, "to some extent, ill-humored
towards Watson, but was both friendly and interested in the
children of both John and Robert; that testator had spoken
both before and after the execution of the Will, of his testamentary provision for the children of Robert; that the
scrivener of the will wrote "Watson" in the will by mistake
where testator desired "Robert" to appear. This evidence
was weighed by the trial court and the children of Robert
were excluded from their claimed share. All the property
went to the children of John. This result was affirmed.
Clearly the language of the instrument was completedy unambiguous. A mistake may have been made in writing the
will. Evidence tending to establish this mistake was received.
The text of the will was given effect as it was written.
Whether this occurred because the fact of mistake was insufficiently evidenced, or because such mistake is irremediable
by extrinsic evidence cannot be determined from this case
alone.
Haines v. Indiana Trust Co. is reported in 75 Ind. App.
651 and was decided in 1921. Kate Brown of Marion County
created a trust for the benefit of her brother David Morris
and one provision in this trust directed the trustee "to pay
the funeral expenses and any doctor bills incurred during the
last illness of said brother." The sole question before the
court was whether this clause permitted the trustee to pay a
bill of $2175 for nursing the brother during the twenty
months prior to his death. The Court said:
". .

the court may inquire into the situation and circumstances

of the testator, and his family, of his property, and his legatees, and the

like, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of the will. [many
citations] * * *
for the reason that
"We cite this long list of authorities * *
we view the * * * circumstances in this case as of controlling force
in determining the intention of the testatrix and the meaning of the
ambiguous expression involved."
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The Court then recounted the age and aloneness and
financial situation of the brother, his known ill health, the
expressed intent of testatrix to provide for all his other
needs. Upon this background it found that "doctor bills"
meant bills for doctoring and that doctoring included the
continued performance of the doctor's directions during the
doctor's absence and hence included nursing by the doctor's
delegate. This result seems to have been required by the
words of the will when read in the light of the circumstances
of the instrument's formulation. But was there ambiguity in
the language before these circumstances were presented and
understood? If I tell you this is a check paying my "doctor
bills" would any one of you have a momentary vision of a
nurse's crisp uniform? The ambiguity existed because the
court enabled itself to see the language of the will from the
armchair of the testatrix.
Mundhenk v. Bierie is reported in 81 Ind. App. 85 having
been decided in 1922. The opinion was written by the same
judge-Judge Nichols-who wrote in the case of the doctor
bills, and no change in the personnel of the judges on the
Appellate bench had occurred between the two cases. John
Bierie of Wells County died in 1917. After other dispositions to his wife and to one other daughter, his will contained
this clause:
"To my daughters Ella and Lizzie I bequeath jointly" certain described land containing eighty acres.

Lizzie died and Ella claims the whole by survivorship thus
seeking to exclude the heir of Lizzie. A proceeding to quiet
title with a cross complaint for partition made the construction of this will clause imperative. Did it mean to create a
joint tenancy or a tenancy in common? The cross complaint
alleged that testator and the one who wrote the will were both
farmers and wholly unacquainted with legal terms; that both
testator and the scrivener believed that "jointly" would create
a tenancy in common, that the leaving of the property in one
tract was solely the product of difficulty in dividing it into
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two parts of equal value. A demurrer to this cross complaint
raised the question as to the materiality and admissibility of
such facts. The Court sustained this demurrer, saying:
"It is well established that extrinsic evidence cannot be received to
vary the terms or provisions of a will where there is no ambiguity."

The word "jointly" was held unambiguously to denote a
joint tenancy and hence to exclude inquiry into extrinsic facts.
It is interesting to contrast the certainty of this Court as to
this meaning of the phrase with the holding of the Supreme
Court of Illinois in Mustain v. Gardner [203 Ill. 284
(1903) ] that this word "jointly" is not even strong enough to
overcome a rebuttable statutory preference, such as is embodied in your statute, Burns § 56-111, for the tenancy in
common construction. How can we know that there is an
ambiguity? Must we wait until the court tells us before we
can be sure? Will the court "peek" behind the language
into the circumstances in every case, and having done so
emerge sometimes with the conclusion there is an ambiguity
so we all must join in the peeking and sometimes with the conclusion that "peeking" is forbidden? This handling of the
process of construction makes it difficult for lawyers properly to perform their function of predicting and causes unnecessary litigation and expense to clients.
Let us look at one more case, reported under the name of
Rodarmel v. Gwinnup in 92 Ind. App. 684 (1931). By the
time of the decision of this case the personnel of the court
had changed somewhat but the opinion is by Judge Enloe,
who was on that bench at the time of both the prior decisions,
and three other judges concurred in all three opinions. William Meredith died in Daviess County in 1926 without close
relatives and leaving a very large estate. A clause of his
will gave the bulk of his estate "to my first cousins and my
second cousins living at my death." The kinsfolk of the
4eceased divided into five groups differentiated by their
ancestry. Taking all first cousins there were found to be
fifteen, and taking all second cousins there were 1361 In a

CONSTRUCTION

OF WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS

proceeding for partition, one of these five groups of cousins,
known as the Meredith heirs, claimed that the testator meant
them only when he wrote the words "first and second cousins."
They offered evidence to sustain this contention which the
trial court received. The evidence was sufficiently persuasive
to cause the trial judge to make a finding of fact in the following words:
"William R. Meredith, intended and believed, at the time of the
execution of his will that the children of the brother and sister of his
father, William S. Meredith, who were living at his death, were the
persons who would be the devisees and legatees under the will, as the
ones included in the language, 'my first cousins living at my death,' that

the testator, William R. Meredith, intended and believed, at the time of
the execution of his will, that the children living at his death, who were
the children of the children of the brother and sister of his father, William S. Meredith, were the persons who would be the devisees and
legatees under his will as the persons included in the language, 'my
second cousins living at my death.' "

The Appellate Court quoted with approval the following
passage from Schouler on Wills: [Vol. II, p. 975 (6th ed.)] :
"The real inquiry is not what the testator intended to express but
what the words do express, the object of construction being to ascertain the intention expressed in the will, his intention existing in his mind
not controlling

It also quoted from the opinion in the earlier Indiana
decision of Daugherty v. Rogers [119 Ind. 254 (1889)]
where the Supreme Court had said:
"However clearly an intention not expressed in the will may be
proved by extrinsic evidence, the rule of law requiring wills to be in
writing stands as an insuperable barrier against carrying the intention
thus proved into execution. The maintenance of this rule in its integrity . . . as a matter of transcendent importance, and, in no
jurisdiction, has the doctrine which denies the right to add anything to
a will by parol been adhered to more steadily than by this court."
That last quotation was taken from an opinion written by

your Supreme Court in 1889 before it had decided the "bank
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stock" case of 1916 but it was quoted by your Appellate
Court after that same court had read-in a nurse into the
phrase "doctor bill."
This consideration of cases at length must not c:ntinue,
but I must mention briefly three holdings of your Supreme
Court made within the past four years. Shandy v. Bell, 207
Ind. 215 (1934) reaffirmed the doctrine that an easement
by necessity is to be read into a deed wholly silent on the
subject, whenever such easement is reasonably necessary for
the fair enjoyment of the claiming tenement. Hutchinsons'
Estate v. Arnt, 210 Ind. 509 (1936) substantially broadened
the expressed scope of a power given to testator's widow to
encroach on the corpus, because of the light thrown on the
problem of intention by an inquiry into the facts of the
family of the testator and the conditions of life to which the
testator and his second wife were accustomed at the time of
the drafting of the will. In Sample v. Butler University,
211 Ind. 122 (1937) the property given by the mutual wills
of a husband and wife was described as the property "which
I may own at the time of my death." Two questions were
raised. First, did this clause by its restrictive language permit the man (who had survived his wife) freely to convey
away anything he chose of the property derived from his
wife? Second, did this cause by its unqualified form subject
to the will, property of this man which he did not derive from
the wife? In both particulars the Court construed the
language in a manner inconsistent with the literal reading of
the will clause. The circumstances of the formulation of the
wills were said to justify these departures from the language
as written.
Where then does this survey of the decisions of Indiana
leave us? It is clear that your Courts frequently do construe
a will in the light of the circumstances of its formulation. It
is not clear as to when resort to this extrinsic evidence is
permitted. We are told it can occur only when the text reveals a latent rather than a patent ambiguity. We are told
further that no resort to extrinsic evidence is proper when
the text reveals a "plain meaning" even though the plain
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meaning so revealed is admittedly not the real intent of the
conveyor. Right in these two positions lies your difficulty.
The decisions of Indiana reveal an intermittent effort to
retain two doctrines which have been extensively abandoned
elsewhere in this country. The allowance of extrinsic evidence to clear up a "latent ambiguity" but the refusal to
allow such evidence for the clarification of a "patent ambiguity" has been condemned by such writers as Wigmore

[§§ 2461, 2472 ff.], Schouler" [§ 1926] and Page [§ 1419],
has been repudiated in many states of this Union and serves
no purpose save to inject a distinction which increases the
necessity for mental gymnastics by the judge anxious to decide cases in accordance with his conscience. Similarly the
so-called "plain meaning rule" affords what sounds like a
sensible restriction upon resort to extrinsic facts until one sees
it in actual operation.
Mr. Justice Holmes in Towne v. Eisner [245 U. S. 418
(1918) ] truly said:
"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged. it is the skin
of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and time in which it is used."
In the Restatement of the Law of Property [Tent. Dr.
No. 7, § 241, Comment a] with the unanimous approval of all
my Advisers, I wrote this:
"Language consists of words which are mere symbols of ideas. The
ideas of the conveyor and the symbols selected by him for their expression are determined by the circumstances of the conveyor at the time
of the conveyance and by his experiences prior thereto. Consequently
any ascertainment of the meaning of language requires consideration of
the atmosphere in which the conveyance originated, and an ascertainment of the associations or connections understood by the conveyor to
exist between the terms of the conveyance and the various possible
objects in the external world. By this process selected symbols which
imperfectly symbolize the conveyor's idea are made more understandable and the danger that a selected symbol will call up in the mind of
the construer a different idea from that which the conveyor intended to
symbolize, is lessened. Language is capable of a clear meaning only
when read in the light of the circumstances of its employment.
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"In the case of a deed or will, as in the case of any writing, this
process is always necessary. * * * The policies embodied in the
Statute of Frauds and in the Statute of Wills, and the necessities
implicit in an orderly and expeditious administration of justice, require
that inquiries as to the meaning of language be kept within reasonable
limits. Normally facts outside an instrument cannot be used to contradict a meaning clearly expressed by the ordinary usage of the words
employed. Seldom indeed is evidence receivable to support a claim
that the conveyor did not mean what he has said. However, it can be
shown that his usage of words was different from the ordinary usage,
*

*

*.

Evidence of this sort is easily fabricated and hence a trier

of fact must be cautious in giving credence to evidence offered to establish such a departure from ordinary usage of language."

This embodies the prevailing law of this country. Chief
Justice Rugg, writing in Massachusetts in 1919 [Mullaney
v. Monahan, 232 Mass. 279] said:
"The fundamental object is to ascertain the real purpose of the
testator, from all the sentences and words he has used, giving them as
far as possible their natural meaning and common signification, but
reading them in the light of their context, of the knowledge of material
surrounding facts possessed by the testator at the time he executed the
instrument, and of the subject matter and the persons to whom his
language is to be applied
.

Similar emphasis upon the vital necessity of reading any
words, no matter how plain they may seem, from the armchair
of the person of whose thoughts they are the symbols, can
be found in the opinions of the Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and many other states [Peet v.
Peet, 229 Ill. 341 (1907); Estate of Clifton, 207 Iowa 71
(1928); Bramley v. lWhite, 281 Mass. 343 (1933) ; Mohr
v. Harder, 103 Neb 545 (1919); Meyers Estate, 289 Pa.

407 (1927).]
If it is true, as I believe it is, that no language has any
meaning unless and until you are able to envisage the atmosphere surrounding the speaker when he spoke, then the
process of construction requires complete freedom in the
offering and reception of any evidence calculated to give the
court an awareness of what the conveyor did mean by the
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words he has written. But it is objected-this denies the
policy of the statute requiring that a will be written. Nothing
is farther from the truth. It merely insists that the reader
of the required writing shall bring to its reading the best
possible equipment enabling him to recapture from the written
word the ideas which the writer had at their selection.
Furthermore, Dean Gavit, in his book to which I have before
referred, demonstrates the very great limits to which we all
allow departure from the written will by proof of facts
extrinsic to the instrument. The limits of such departures
are not set by statute but by judicial decision that the
departure better serves justice than arid adherence to the
letter of what is written. Thus fraud, duress or mistake in
the execution of a will excludes the animus testandi. The
fact of fraud or of undue influence vitiates a gift made in
no uncertain terms by a will. But as Dean Gavit says:
"Note well, that is because we accept the parol evidence and not the
written evidence in the instrument." [§ 35]
The requirement of a writing for a will is no more entitled to
unqualified acceptance than is that other part of the law
which admits parol evidence to nullify, modify or to replace
part of the language in the writing. Both of these elements
are equally parts of our substantive law.
If the review of the Indiana cases which we have made
together this afternoon has served the purpose which I
have hoped it would, you now need little persuasion on the
following propositions:
First: the distinction between "latent" and "patent" ambiguities is not useful and should be discarded.
Second: the "plain meaning rule" does not in fact decide
cases, but rather conceals the processes actually followed
by the courts of this and other states in the construing of
wills.
Third: language is so colored by the circumstances of its
formulation that the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence as to such circumstances is not justified.
This will not clog the processes of justice by opening the
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flood gates to large new bodies of evidence on issues now
excluded from litigation. It has not so worked in the stateg
which have adopted the suggested attitude. In the ordinary
case there will be no facts which, if produced, would affect
the rights of any party. In response to Mr. Justice
Holmes' comment that a word is not a crystal, Max Radin
of California rejoined that neither was it a portmanteau.
This is true and in this truth we find the practical safeguard
in the proposed rule. Only within very narrow limits is
there any hope of persuading a court to depart from what is
written. It is not usual for a person to mean the opposite of
what he writes. Frequently he expresses himself awkwardly
and incompletely. Whenever anyone believes he has facts
which show that the written word is contrary to, or an
awkward, or incomplete expression he must be privileged to
present them, without requiring him first to get those facts
insurreptitiously to make the Court recognize the existence
of that phantom, an ambiguity. The reception of such
evidence does not necessarily mean that the instrument will
be construed otherwise than it would have been without it.
The question of the sufficiency of the evidence remains after
its admissibility has been granted.
If there is still among us a doubting Thomas who hesitates
to discard the glittering bauble of the "plain meaning rule"
in the construing of wills and similar dispositive instruments,
may I extend a specal invitation to that gentleman to be
present on the morrow when I shall discuss the similar
problem in connection with statutes.

